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Abstract 
 
This paper explains how the inevitable trade-offs between risk and cost in occupational health and 
safety (OHS) regulation are managed across EU member states. While trade-offs are explicitly 
sanctioned in UK law, many continental countries mandate ambitious goals of safety. This contrast 
in statutory goals appears to reflect cleavages identified in the risk regulation literature between 
European precaution and Anglo-Saxon neoliberal risk-taking, as well as in the Varieties of 
Capitalism literature which suggests workers are better protected in co-ordinated than in liberal 
market economies. However, we challenge those claims through a detailed analysis of OHS 
regimes in the UK, Netherlands, Germany and France, which shows that a narrow focus on 
headline regulatory goals misses how each country makes cost-benefit trade-offs on safety. In 
particular, we show how the nature and outcome of those trade-offs substantially vary according 
to the degree of coupling between regulation and welfare regimes, and to national traditions of 
common and civil law. As such, we offer a novel explanation for risk regulation and governance 
variety that emphasises deep institutional differences among welfare states in the organization of 
the political economy and their philosophies of regulation. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2007, the UK finally won a protracted battle with the European Commission (EC) over its explicit 
framing of occupational health and safety (OHS) regulation as a trade-off between safety and cost 
(C-127/05, Commission v. UK [2007] ECR I-4619). The controversy began a decade earlier when the 
EC referred the UK to the European Court of Justice, alleging that UK law compromised the goal of 
European OHS regulation by stipulating that workers should only be protected against harm ‘so far 
as is reasonably practicable’. The EC argued that this qualification was inconsistent with the 
Framework Directive’s (89/391/EEC) requirement to “ensure the safety and health of workers in 
every aspect related to the work”. Other EU member states had transposed the Directive in ways 
that emphasised the reduction of workplace risks to the minimum possible, and so should the UK. 
The UK argued, however, that given it was “impossible to eliminate all [workplace] risks” (HSE 
1989, 17), it was better to ensure that the cost, time and effort required to reduce risk was not 
grossly disproportionate to the benefit gained. 
 This conflict over trade-offs between cost and safety speaks to important debates about risk 
regulation and varieties of capitalism in Europe. On the one hand, many- often US-based- 
commentators have identified an increasing European proclivity for precautionary risk regulation 
that inhibits growth (e.g.Sunstein 2005). Yet since ensuring workplace safety inevitably carries 
costs, it is puzzling how other EU-member states can comply with the Directive’s goal of safety 
without reducing their competitiveness vis-à-vis the UK. On the other hand, critics of Anglo-Saxon 
neoliberalism often decry the turn to risk-based rationales as deregulatory assaults on public 
protections (e.g.Dodds 2006). That argument is consistent with the Varieties of Capitalism 
literature, which suggests that liberal market economies offer weaker protections to workers than 
the coordinated market economies of continental Europe (Mares 2001). However, far from having 
their safety compromised by the UK’s risk-based approach, the latest Eurostat (2014) data suggest 
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that UK workers enjoy levels of safety comparable to other EU-member states. Indeed, while 
injury and illness statistics should be treated with caution, it is notable that UK fatal injury rates 
(0.58/100,000) are lower than in the coordinated- and state-market economies of Germany (0.89) 
and France (2.36) where the legal requirement for safety is unqualified. 
 These puzzles suggest that contemporary regulatory debates may overlook important 
differences within the EU in how member states think about and manage risk. In this article, 
therefore, we use the case of OHS regulation to compare how regulatory goals in the UK, 
Netherlands, Germany and France are reconciled with the inevitable trade-offs between the risks 
to worker safety and the cost of protection. Drawing on material from an international research 
project, we challenge contemporary explanations of national regulatory variety, highlighting the 
importance of legal traditions, regulatory norms and practices, and even the design of welfare 
states in shaping risk regulation regimes. 
 
2. Why risk regulation might vary across Europe 
In qualifying the goal of OHS regulation with the ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ (SFAIRP) 
principle, the UK has adopted an explicitly risk-based approach that has become increasingly 
central to regulatory reform programmes around the world (Rothstein et al 2006). Proponents of 
risk-based regulation insist that trying to prevent all adverse regulatory outcomes, however 
unlikely or small, is disproportionately costly to achieve and can perversely create other risks, or 
distract attention from more serious problems (Breyer 1993; Graham 2010). Instead, they argue 
that it is more rational, efficient and socially optimal to calibrate regulatory efforts in proportion 
to risk, as judged by both the probability and the consequence of harm occurring (Baldwin and 
Black 2010). One hypothetical example might be repairing railway lines, where maximum possible 
safety could be achieved by costly closures of the whole line during maintenance, but it might be 
more reasonably practicable to keep the trains running by using warning signals and posting 
lookouts. 
 The universalizing promise of such risk calculus suggests the potential for convergence in the 
framing of regulatory goals across policy domains and national contexts. Certainly, risk-based 
approaches have become commonplace across Anglo-Saxon countries and in a wide range of 
policy domains, having strong proponents in a variety of powerful national and supranational 
organisations, such as the OMB, WTO and OECD (OECD 2010). Even the EU is now promoting risk-
based approaches to policy formation and implementation in domains such as food-safety and 
flood risk management. 
 There are, however, at least three reasons to expect unevenness in the adoption of risk-based 
regulation. First, some commentators argue that national policy stances will vary depending on 
the strength and configuration of economic interests. For example, countries may advocate risk-
based approaches to open-up foreign markets to exports, but likewise resist them to protect 
domestic producers from imports (Vogel 1995). Lofstedt (2013), for example, has pointed to how 
Sweden can afford a strict phase-out policy on chemicals because of its small chemicals sector, but 
would be unlikely to champion strict controls on forest-products. As the European Parliament has 
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gained more power within the EU, so this additional veto point has amplified the significance of 
such national positions in EU policy-making. 
 Second, pioneering research on environmental regulation in the 1980s pointed to the 
importance of national institutional settings in shaping risk regulation (e.g.Kelman 1981). Most 
notably, Brickman et al (1985) showed how quantitative risk analysis emerged in the US as a 
defensive rationale for legitimating decision-making in the context of highly adversarial regulatory 
processes, but that risk ideas were less necessary in the more closed, cooperative and informal 
regulatory settings of European polities. More recent comparative research has focused on 
contrasting US-EU approaches to precaution (Vogel 2011; Weiner et al 2010), but that has done 
little to illuminate differences among EU member-states. 
 Rothstein et al (2013), however, have recently suggested that variation in governance norms 
and accountability structures across EU member states may create unevenness in the uptake of 
risk tools. They note that while the UK has enthusiastically adopted risk-based rationales for 
regulatory action in the face of increasing accountability demands on regulators, such rationales 
can conflict with other expectations of state action. In Germany, for example, the constitutional 
principle of Schutzpflicht constrains state intervention in the absence of identifiable ‘dangers’, 
while in France constitutional demands for solidarity and equality potentially conflict with the 
discrimination demanded by risk-based prioritization. 
 A third perspective on differences amongst EU member states is provided by the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature (e.g.Hall and Soskice 2001). Its focus on variations in the organization of 
national political economies suggests different fault lines over risk regulation than the familiar 
transatlantic comparisons of precaution. Although VoC has had little to say about risk regulation, 
its focus on nationally specific institutional settings that complement the development of different 
models of capitalism points to features such as welfare and corporatist bargaining arrangements 
that might help explain variety in OHS regulation across Europe. 
 Mares (2001, Ch.4), for example, has argued that coordinated and state market economies 
(CMEs/SMEs) such as Germany, Netherlands and France support strong labour regulation and 
generous welfare regimes as a way of protecting investments by employers and employees in 
developing the firm- and industry- specific skills characteristic of those economies. Risk-based 
regulatory approaches limiting worker protection might seem antagonistic to such contexts. By 
contrast, such risk-based balances might be more acceptable in liberal market economies (LMEs) 
such as the UK, where weaker labour regulation and welfare provision are argued to complement 
more flexible labour markets in which workers and employers are less committed to sustaining 
long-term employment relationships. Certainly a number of OHS commentators have pointed to 
the use of risk rhetoric as cover for deregulation and ever diminishing protection for workers, be it 
reduced numbers of inspections or lessened compensation for accidents (Tombs and Whyte 
2013). 
 Others, however, suggest that variations in regulation and welfare provision observed across 
market economies may be related to legal traditions that predate capitalism. Botero et al (2004), 
for example, have argued that common law countries are likely to have less protective labour 
regulation and less generous welfare regimes than civil law countries because of the greater 
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emphasis on freedom of contract and the greater role of markets in providing insurance in the 
former countries compared to the latter (see also Ahlering and Deakin 2007). 
 In order to explore the extent to which such arguments can explain different attitudes towards 
risk-based regulation across Europe, we now compare whether and how the goals of OHS 
regulation are reconciled with the inevitable trade-offs between workplace safety and cost in the 
UK, Netherlands, France and Germany. OHS offers an attractive case-study because it is a non-
traded cross-sectoral issue so that any observed differences in headline regulatory goals would be 
hard to explain in terms of trade-protectionism. Moreover, our chosen countries are all advanced 
industrialised EU member states, so that any differences in regulatory design cannot be attributed 
to economic structure or state capacities. However, as an issue that is centrally concerned with 
the political economy of labour relations, OHS regulation might be expected to follow VoC 
predictions about the varying strength of labour protection across Europe. Our countries have 
therefore been chosen to reflect differences between co-ordinated, state and liberal market 
economies as well as those between common and civil law traditions. Our analysis combines desk-
based documentary review with an extensive programme of in-depth interviews, and later cross-
checking of factual descriptions in this article, with key regulatory officials, practitioner, business 
and labour stakeholders in all four countries. 
 
3. The Evolution of Modern European OHS Regimes 
The cost of workplace accidents is not a new concern. Legal codes in ancient Greece, Rome and 
China provided precise schedules to compensate for lost limbs and other injuries (Guyton 1999), 
while the Law of Æthelberht, the oldest surviving English law code, was also concerned largely 
with compensation. Strictly defined ex post compensation regimes disappeared under feudalism, 
so as the industrial revolution dawned, workplace safety was largely managed at the discretion of 
employers. Tort suits were costly and difficult to win, not least because the law limited employer 
liability on the presumption that the potential for workplace accidents was anticipated in wages 
negotiated by workers. Indeed, in the UK, colourfully termed ‘right to die contracts’ explicitly 
excluded the possibility of civil litigation (Hennock, 2007). 
 Pressure for reform mounted during the 19th century. Employers became anxious about the 
increasing success of civil actions, organised labour started to protest and, in Germany, the army 
was even concerned about the impact of poor labour conditions on their young conscripts. In that 
context, governments across Europe (and indeed North America [cf Lubove 1986]) established the 
first regulatory regimes to reduce accidents and illness amongst workers, as well as social 
insurance regimes to cover the income, welfare and medical costs of work-related injuries, illness 
and death. A complex set of varying institutional arrangements and practices subsequently 
emerged across our four countries, as outlined below. 
 
Germany 
Germany takes a ‘dual system’ approach to OHS, combining largely enabling statutory regulation 
with an interventionist social insurance regime. The modern regulatory regime dates back to the 
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1891 Industrial Code, which generalised a Prussian decree of 1839 to the rest of the German 
Empire by setting out employers’ obligations to safeguard workers against dangers to life and 
health, ‘insofar as permitted by the nature of the business’. These general requirements were not, 
however, judiciable; rather their purpose was to provide a legal basis for state intervention by 
newly established inspectorates (Hennock 2007 p131). Indeed, there was little enforceable 
general OHS law until the 1996 Occupational Safety Law, which, in transposing the EU Directive 
(89/391/EEC), mandated that the ‘endangering of life and physical as well as psychological health 
[should be] avoided if possible and the remaining endangerment should be reduced to a 
minimum’. A number of federal ordinances have since been issued under the 1996 Law, for 
example, on hazardous substances (Paul and Huber 2015), but with the exception of transposing 
EU rules, the State has overwhelmingly refrained from setting out the precise criteria for legal 
compliance, having delegated this task to the social insurance regime at the end of the nineteenth 
century. 
 The social insurance regime was established by the 1884 Industrial Insurance Act, which 
effectively reinvented the strictly defined compensation regimes of antiquity. The Act abolished 
the civil liability of employers in favour of a strict no-fault liability scheme of tabulated 
compensation for all income and medical costs of work-related injuries, illness and death. The 
scheme is administered by the Berufsgenossenschaften (BGs): a set of powerful regional and 
sectoral mutual trade associations established in law under the Social Code and governed jointly 
by both employers and employees. The BGs are corporatist self-regulatory organisations that 
typify the German model of coordinating, rather than directing, the economy. Funded through 
compulsory contributions by employers, the BGs set premiums based on, inter alia, the riskiness of 
the sector, individual firms’ accident rates and the associated costs to the BGs. It is the BGs that 
flesh out the vast majority of compliance criteria through a complex mass of detailed, sectorally-
specific and often legally-binding ‘accident prevention rules’, technical standards and guidance. 
 These twin pillars of the German regime are enforced by the Länder Labour Inspectorates as 
well as by the BGs’ own technical inspectorates. First established in 1853, today’s Länder Labour 
Inspectorates serve a specialist policing function. Acting largely under administrative law, they 
draw on BG accident prevention rules, standards and guidance to assess regulatory compliance 
and deploy a conventional enforcement pyramid of escalating sanctions in proportion to the risks 
posed by violations. By contrast, the BGs’ technical inspectorates play more of an advisory role to 
facilitate employer compliance with BG rules. They can also prosecute under administrative law, 
however, and have the power to recommend premium increases. 
 
France 
France also has a dual system for preventing and compensating workplace injuries and illness but, 
in keeping with France’s dirigiste tradition, statutory regulation plays a much greater role than in 
Germany. France’s statutory regime dates back to the 1893 Industrial Establishments Act, which 
created a general obligation for all employers to provide ‘clean and safe working conditions’ for 
their workers. As in Germany, this broad goal of safety was not itself justiciable until the 1980s 
(Chaumette 1992, pp19/25). Instead, the goal was fleshed out through an ever accumulating mass 
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of detailed and inflexible regulations in the statutory Labour Code. As Chaumette (1992, p35) has 
noted, neither employers nor courts ‘have any discretion whatsoever as to the cost, utility, 
technical difficulty or efficiency of safety measures’. The Code is overseen by the Ministry of 
Labour and enforced by its regionally-based Labour Inspectorate (DIRECCTE), using a conventional 
pyramid of sanctions in response to non-compliance. 
 The social insurance regime in France, as in Germany, plays an important role in preventing 
accidents and ill-health. The regime was created by the 1898 Workmen’s Compensation Act, which 
replaced the civil liability of employers with a no-fault liability approach that compensated 
workers for lost income and medical costs from work-related injuries, illness and death. 
Compensation is administered by the Caisses; a set of powerful national, regional and sectoral 
mutual associations funded by mandatory employer contributions and governed by the social 
partners. Premiums reflect what is known as the ‘cost of risk’, calculated actuarially from detailed 
historical data on compensation costs for the sector and/or particular businesses (HSE 1996, Ch.2, 
p66). The regime was absorbed into the social security system in 1946, but it still acts through the 
Caisses. 
 Like the German BGs, the Caisses also issue technically detailed ‘accident prevention’ rules, but 
which are principally advisory in nature. Companies are assisted in implementing these rules by 
the Caisses’ own dedicated corps of engineers and technicians, which can even subsidise 
improvements in the workplace. While lacking statutory powers, this quasi-inspectorate can 
nevertheless ‘invite’ companies to take preventative action under threat of premium increases, 
issue ‘improvement notices’ to follow accident prevention rules, or notify the labour inspectorate 
of legal contraventions. 
 
UK 
In contrast to the dual systems of Germany and France, the UK relies solely on statutory regulation 
to control injuries and sickness amongst workers (Baldwin 1992; Demeritt et al 2015). The 
regulatory regime was founded on the 19th century Factory Acts, which by the 1960s had evolved 
into a hugely complex patchwork of highly prescriptive and inflexible safety ‘standards’ providing 
inconsistent levels of protection across sectors. The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 
(HSWA), however, fundamentally transformed the regulatory regime by introducing a more 
flexible ‘principles-based’ approach. Under the HSWA, employers must ensure, so far as is 
reasonably practicable (SFAIRP), the safety, health and welfare of employees, whether or not 
anyone has been hurt. This risk-based principle requires that employers take all physically and 
technically possible measures until the cost, time and effort of doing more is grossly 
disproportionate to both the likelihood and the consequence of the harm occurring. Enforcement 
responsibilities for low- and high-risk workplaces are mostly divided between expert inspectors 
employed by local authorities (LAs) and the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), which is a 
dedicated national regulatory agency created under the HSWA. Those inspectors have traditionally 
been able to draw on their expertise to offer advice, but they also have recourse to a pyramid of 
enforcement sanctions, such as administrative improvement and prohibition notices, which are 
ultimately enforceable through criminal prosecution. 
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 Unlike Germany and France, compensation arrangements to cover the lost income and medical 
costs of work-related accidents and sickness have played no role in shaping OHS regulation and 
enforcement. In 1897, the Workers' Compensation Act established a no-fault liability regime, 
funded through employers’ non-statutory private insurance arrangements, to pay for work-related 
accident and sickness costs for a range of industries. The regime was extended to all workplaces in 
1911 by a National Insurance scheme which was administered by state ‘approved’ mutual 
associations and jointly funded by state and mandatory employer and employee contributions 
without regard to the riskiness of individual workplaces. After WWII, the regime was effectively 
‘nationalised’ through the Beveridge reforms with injury costs socialised through taxpayer-funded 
social security benefits and the new National Health Service (NHS). Employees still have the right 
to sue for damages but only if employers’ negligence can be proven and the state deducts medical 
costs and social security benefits from successful awards. 
 
Netherlands 
As in the UK, the Netherlands principally relies on statutory regulation to control occupational 
injuries and sickness (de Gier 1992; Popma et al 2002). That regulatory regime was founded on the 
1895 Safety at Work Act, which initially applied to only a limited number of sectors. Over the next 
century, however, the regime was broadened to cover all sectors through a complex mixture of 
statutory decrees, regulations, codes and guidance, which prescribed in great detail how 
employers should protect their employees from harms in specific contexts. In the spirit of the UK’s 
HSWA, the Dutch sought to create a more proportionate regulatory environment with the 1980 
Working Environment Act (WEA), which qualified the general duty of employers to ‘aim for 
maximum possible safety’ with the proviso ‘as far as can reasonably be required’. While that 
qualification superficially resembled the UK’s approach, the WEA retained the pre-existing mass of 
statutory regulations. Dutch regulators have since sought to replace those absolute duties with 
non-statutory ‘Labour Catalogues’ providing sectorally-specific advice on meeting regulatory 
obligations. Though non-statutory, the Labour Catalogues have strong evidential force for the 
courts and for the Labour Inspectorate (SWZ), which is responsible for OHS enforcement. Now 
part of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the SWZ was established in 1919, making it 
the first dedicated national inspectorate in the Netherlands. 
 As in Britain, the Dutch social insurance regime for covering the income and medical costs of 
work-related accidents and sickness plays no role in prevention. The 1901 Work Accidents Act 
prohibited civil litigation (revised since) in favour of a disability benefits system funded through 
non-statutory employer contributions to a set of mutual insurance associations- the 
Bedrijfsverenigingen- jointly controlled by employer associations and trade unions. Initially the 
regime covered only a small number of hazardous industries, but by the second half of the century 
the Bedrijfs’ had expanded to provide disability benefits for all sectors. Rather like the UK, the 
expanded regime was funded through a combination of mandatory employer and employee 
contributions, which were based on employee numbers and salaries rather than on the riskiness of 
the workplace. The Bedrijfs’ were incorporated into the Social Security Agency (UWV) twenty 
years ago, but in an attempt to stem the increasing number of workers on disability benefit, 
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employers are now required to fund benefits for the first two years. The medical costs of work-
related injuries, however, are entirely decoupled from OHS regulation, since they are met by 
mandatory individual health insurance. 
 
4. Explaining Variety 
As these brief country overviews show, the OHS Framework Directive was transposed upon 
national OHS regimes with diverse and deeply embedded structures and principles. In France and 
Germany, for example, OHS statutes emphasise the reduction of risks to a minimum possible, 
whereas in the UK and Netherlands the goal of safety is qualified- at least in principle- by cost 
considerations. While France, Germany and the Netherlands flesh out their regulatory goals 
through a complex mass of highly prescriptive sector-specific rules, the UK replaced prescription 
with a more flexible ‘principles-based’ approach forty years ago. And while the social insurance 
regimes of France and Germany play an active role in accident prevention, the UK and the 
Netherlands rely solely on regulation. As a consequence of those varied institutional settings, our 
four countries have faced different problems in reconciling the Directive’s ambitious goal of safety 
with the costs of achieving it. In the following section, we show how those trade-offs have been 
accommodated in three distinct ways. 
 
Rules and the qualification of safety in different legal traditions 
The first way in which the trade-offs at stake in OHS have been accommodated reflects the 
contrasting legal traditions of the UK and the other three countries. British common law places 
great weight on judicial interpretation of the law; the consistency of that interpretation being 
ensured by constraining judges to interpret statutes according to their literal or plain meaning 
(albeit with limited scope to avoid absurd or cruel results), and by demanding consistency with the 
precedential decisions (the ‘common law’) of higher courts. In that context, the courts have 
interpreted the SFAIRP principle by drawing on mining case-law from the 1940s, which concerned 
a miner who had been killed by a collapsed mine roadway (Edwards v. National Coal Board (NCB), 
[1949] 1 All ER 743). In that case the Court of Appeal ruled that “‘reasonably practicable’ is a 
narrower term than ‘physically possible’” and that it would have been unreasonable to expect the 
NCB to shore up all roadways, since the cost and effort required to reduce risk should not be in 
“gross disproportion” to the benefit gained. 
 That common law tradition helps explain why the UK fought so hard to succeed at the ECJ 
insofar as SFAIRP was an essential part of 1974 HSWA. Without that qualification, the HSE argued 
that legal literalism would make- more or less- every workplace in breach of the law since it would 
be impossible to “ensure” the health and safety of workers as the Directive demanded (HSE 1989 
p17). It is conceivable that in the face of such an absurd situation the courts might have responded 
by exercising interpretative discretion to restore proportionality to the law, but that would have 
been controversial if Parliament had actively removed the principle when transposing the 
Directive. 
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 By contrast, civil law systems, such as found in the Netherlands, Germany and France, assert 
the primacy of the legislature over the judiciary. Under separation of powers doctrines judges are 
merely expected to mechanically implement the law, which in principle should be sufficiently 
complete, coherent and clear so as not to demand interpretation (Merryman 1985,p29). In 
practice, since legislatures are rarely able to anticipate all cases that could come before the courts, 
statutes tend to take the form of general legal frameworks for which, as the HSE (1989 p15) has 
pointed out, "literal interpretation is not expected”. As Huber (2009 p15) has observed, the 
German legislator “refrains from settling the details and must be satisfied [with] formulating the 
principles and the big guidelines”. In that context, judicial consistency and predictability come not 
from judicial interpretation but from the further elaboration of extensive codes of legal rules and 
guidance that give expression to the meaning of general statutes. 
 One way of thinking about general duties in continental legal jurisdictions is as aspirational, 
rather than as unambiguous, requirements. For example, the German headline regulatory goal of 
avoiding endangerment “wherever possible” does not mean that German courts necessarily 
expect employers to do everything that is possible irrespective of cost (Wank 1992,p59). As 
already noted, this goal- like its equivalent in France- was not judiciable for most of the twentieth 
century. Rather in civil law systems the emphasis would be on compliance with the extensive 
legally-based rules and guidance such as those issued by the German BGs. In effect, the goal of 
safety is defined in terms of meeting specified rules rather than the prevention of harm per se. 
 One striking consequence of how these two legal traditions have addressed OHS is that they 
have favoured different balances between precision and flexibility in rule design. As Diver (1983) 
has observed, precise rules help ensure legal consistency but the problem of ‘requisite variety’ 
(Ashby 1956) means that as rules become narrower so their number has to increase to match the 
variety of circumstances that they must meet. Flexible rules, by contrast, can cope with a wide 
variety of unanticipated circumstances, but they must be accompanied by commonly held 
interpretative principles to ensure consistent application. 
 Understood in those terms, the problem besetting the UK’s old prescriptive regime under the 
Factories Acts was one of requisite variety, insofar as the rules failed to provide sufficiently 
nuanced and consistent coverage across sectors (Demeritt et al 2015). For example, powered saws 
required multiple guards, even if they were carefully protected museum exhibits, while inspectors 
could not go beyond regulatory requirements to demand the total containment of mechanically-
fed wood-cutting machinery, even if this significantly increased safety for only a small cost. Some 
sectors, such as retail, were left entirely unprotected for decades. 
 The reform to the UK regime in 1974 solved those problems by replacing prescriptive rules with 
a general regulatory principle, which permitted explicit trade-offs between safety and cost on a 
case-by-case basis. That solution was only possible, however, because the UK’s common law legal 
tradition provided a framework for consistent legal interpretation of that qualified goal. Indeed, by 
providing a common interpretative principle to assess legal compliance in the absence of 
prescriptive rules, SFAIRP- and more generally ‘principles-based’ regulation, which OHS regulation 
has come to exemplify- was very much the product of a common law legal tradition. 
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 By contrast, such principles-based approaches do not fit well with the way that civil law 
jurisdictions ensure legal consistency. In response to the requisite variety problem, continental 
OHS regulation has spawned an extensive corpus of rules to meet the extraordinary variety of 
situation-specific problems that have to be managed in the workplace. For example, it would not 
be unusual to find in the rule books of the Dutch Labour Catalogues, German BGs, French Caisses 
and Labour Code, very detailed, sector-specific rules and guidance on the use of ladders both 
outdoors and indoors and in wet and dry conditions. All three countries even have rules that seek 
to manage the most esoteric of risks such as tiger-taming, with different rules for circuses and 
zoos. The UK, by contrast, has implemented EU rules on ladders in a very general way and has no 
rules on tiger-taming; both hazards, however, are covered by the SFAIRP principle. 
 Legal traditions, therefore, help explain both why the UK could not accept the wording of the 
EU Framework Directive, as well as how the emphasis of German and French statutes on safety is 
mitigated by the associated rules, codes and guidance that give legal substance to what is, in 
effect, an aspirational duty on employers. Another consequence, however, is that just as the 
German and French duties for safety are aspirational, so is the Dutch qualification that permits 
cost as a consideration. In the Dutch civil law tradition, that seemingly flexible aspiration is 
constrained by the corpus of rules, codes and guidance that courts use to assess legal compliance 
irrespective of the cost-effectiveness of doing more than required. Indeed, as Ale (2005) has 
observed, while the concept of ALARA- or ‘As Low As Reasonably Achievable’- is often used in UK 
public protection with an analogous meaning to SFAIRP, in the Netherlands ALARA judicially means 
‘As Large As Regulators Allow’. Therefore, while rules, codes and guidance in France and Germany 
mitigate aspirational goals of safety, in the Dutch context they mitigate the value of flexible 
headline regulatory goals. 
 
Cost-benefit trade-offs embodied in corporatist rule-making 
While legal traditions help explain the interpretative context of regulatory goals across our four 
countries, they do not explain how the detailed rules, codes and guidance accommodate the 
inevitable risk trade-offs between worker safety and cost. We therefore need to examine the 
institutional context in which these trade-offs are made. That context is not one of apolitical 
technical deliberation, but instead is marked by various forms of corporatist negotiation between 
employers, employees and the state. 
 In the UK, trade-offs between worker safety and the costs of achieving it, are explicitly 
permitted in law under the 1974 HSWA. However, in addition to transforming the legal landscape, 
the Act also created a new powerful regulatory agency, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 
overseen by a Commission (since absorbed into the HSE) with tripartite representation from 
government, business, and unions. Fairman (2007) has persuasively argued that this corporatist 
setting provides significant political legitimacy for the HSE’s risk-based approach to managing 
trade-offs, as is evidenced by the explicit support of both unions and employers for the approach 
in a recent government review (Loftsedt 2011). 
 The detailed rules, codes and guidance that typify the OHS regimes of our other three countries 
are shaped by their own distinctive corporatist arrangements. In the Netherlands, consultation is a 
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central feature of the polity (Kickert 2003) and OHS is no exception. Thus the regulations, codes 
and guidance historically issued by the Ministry for Social Affairs and Employment entailed 
extensive formal consultation with the ‘social partners’ through powerful tri-partite corporatist 
institutions such as the Working Environment Council, and the Social and Economic Council. This 
corporatist approach was reinforced in 2007 by the replacement of these statutory rules with the 
non-statutory ‘Labour Catalogues’ which are elaborated by the social partners on a sectoral basis. 
These were explicitly introduced as a means of making compliance criteria more flexible and as 
such they inevitably reflect pragmatic trade-offs on the costs of securing the health and safety of 
workers. 
 In the distinctive welfare state contexts of the dual systems of Germany and France, however, 
trade-offs in rule-making are driven as much, if not more, by containing the ex post costs of 
accidents and ill-health as by containing the ex ante costs of prevention. The German case is 
clearest. Historically, Bismarck supported the BGs having an active role in OHS because of his 
vociferous opposition to state regulation as an illegitimate interference in private production; not 
least, as Hennock (2007) has entertainingly noted, because of his dim view of a factory inspection 
of his own sawmill. In fact, the self-regulatory system of BGs built on the long-standing and much 
valued freedom of the German guilds- the so-called Gewerbefreiheit- to organise economic 
production without state interference. The assumption was that it would be in the BGs’ own 
interests to formulate safety rules that would optimise the balance between the costs to business 
of safety measures and insurance premiums. As Hennock (2007, p.99) has argued, “Safety 
measures whose costs could not be justified by clearly foreseeable savings in compensation 
payments were ruled out from the beginning”. Or put another way, it might be cheaper to pay-out 
than prevent some kinds of accidents. 
 These days, BGs make three-way trade-offs between safety and the costs of prevention and 
compensation through tripartite corporatist negotiations with representatives of employers, 
employees and the state within ‘expert’ committees. BG rule-making takes a wide range of forms, 
from detailed design standards, such as for butchers’ meat slicing machines, to general 
requirements, such as having a guild-style certified ‘master’ present when taming tigers. Indeed, 
the same hazards may be regulated differently across different BGs, reflecting the different 
balance of safety and compensation costs struck in different economic contexts. In recent years, 
the BGs have shifted away from legally binding accident prevention regulations towards technical 
standards and best practice guidance, both in response to Single Market pressures as well as to 
successive BG mergers that have necessitated reconciliation of historically diverse rules. This 
deregulatory programme, in principle, gives employers greater compliance flexibility, but the 
extensive guidance still has evidential force. 
 In France, the central state plays a more formal role in rule-making than in Germany through 
the state-issued Labour Code. Overseen by the Ministry of Labour, this detailed body of rules is the 
outcome of corporatist negotiations through national level tripartite bodies and technical 
committees, such as the Conseil d’Orientation sur les Conditions de Travail (COCT). In practice, 
Ministry representatives are said to proverbially sit at the back of the room while employers and 
employees hammer out acceptable compromises that balance the costs of protection against 
marginal increases in safety (Henry 2012; Verdier 2012). Indeed, Henry (2011: p150) suggests that 
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the State avoids actively participating because the inevitable differential exposures of workers and 
publics to risk creates potential conflicts with the French constitutional guarantee of equality. 
 Likewise, the extensive accident prevention rules issued by the Caisses are formulated by their 
Regional Technical Committees, which comprise equal numbers of employer and employee 
representatives (HSE 1996, Ch.2, p66). These committees have a close interest in the impact of 
their rules on business costs, jobs and compensation risk, since they also determine contribution 
rates for establishments and can vary those rates according to performance. Consequently, their 
rules are likely to balance the costs to business of additional safety measures against the 
containment of compensation costs as much as against preventing illness and injury. 
 
Making trade-offs through regulatory enforcement and social insurance 
Enforcement action by regulatory inspectors and social insurers provides a third way in which the 
trade-offs between worker safety and cost inherent to OHS regulation are accommodated within 
our four countries. With its principles-based approach to OHS regulation, trade-offs are 
acknowledged up-front in UK law, so the challenge is ensuring that they are appropriate and that 
risk is reduced SFAIRP in every case. In the absence of prescriptive rules, the UK relies on 
regulatory enforcement by a technically expert inspectorate to judge legal compliance. Inspector 
discretion, however, is constrained by case-law and best-practice guidance published by the HSE 
and other bodies such as the British Standards Institute, and the criminal law framework of OHS 
regulation provides incentives for employers to heed inspector judgment. Black (2002) has 
characterised this process as a ‘regulatory conversation’ in which employers and inspectors 
identify practices that the courts are likely to regard as constituting legal compliance. 
 By contrast, the more prescriptive approach of our other three countries has favoured greater 
concentration of regulatory expertise in rule-making processes. However, prescription still poses 
the requisite variety problem of accommodating situations that are specific to individual 
workplaces. That problem is mitigated, in part, through cultures of regulatory enforcement and in 
France and Germany by the activities of social insurance organisations. 
 In the Netherlands, the ‘ruliness’ of the OHS regime is mitigated is through a diagnostically 
Dutch approach to enforcement that Van Waarden (2009) terms ‘informal consensualism’. While 
there is little formal scope for discretion on the application of specific duties, inspection cultures 
tend to favour pragmatic and non-legal negotiated solutions. This approach has been reinforced 
by: the framing of OHS regulation as predominantly administrative rather than criminal law (de 
Gier 1992, p160); the WEA’s legal duty on employers and employees to find ‘reasonable’ solutions 
and on inspectors to persuade rather than punish (Popma et al 2002, p191); and the recent 
introduction of non-statutory Labour Catalogues. Overall the emphasis on dialogue between 
inspectors and employers to determine what is reasonable has led to a strong resemblance 
between the UK and Dutch regimes. 
 Nevertheless, the tension between the rule-based tradition of civil law and the emphasis on 
flexibility headlined in the WEA remains. For example, stung by public criticism of its business 
enforcement in the early 1990s, the Inspectorate’s approach became more legalistic and less 
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flexible (Popma et al 2002, p192). On those rare occasions when cases go to trial, courts have 
interpreted the concept of reasonableness in terms of technical possibility, or as one labour 
lawyer commented to us, as “geared towards the elimination of risks”, rather than in terms of how 
safe is safe enough. Frustration with that approach led some industry representatives and 
politicians to advocate a more risk-based numerical definition of ‘reasonable’, but that has so far 
has proved elusive in the context of significant sectoral variation in what constitutes acceptable 
risk (Rimington et al 2003). 
 In contrast to the UK and Netherlands, the state inspectorates in the dual systems of Germany 
and France are constrained from playing decisive roles in shaping workplace safety practices 
largely because they spend most of their time enforcing general labour law (eg HSE 1996, Ch.3, 
p53). Moreover, administrative law- under which most breaches are prosecuted in the absence of 
serious harm actually occurring- makes for a relatively weak sanctioning regime. In that context, 
there is some scope for accommodating the inevitable trade-offs between cost and additional 
safety that are needed on a case-by-case basis (e.g.Wank 1992, 67). 
 In Germany, for example, discretion by the Länder Inspectorates is facilitated by statutory 
ordinances that tend to refer to the ‘state-of-the-art’ and a formidable corpus of BG rules, which 
may themselves be framed as procedural norms, such as delegating judgements to guild-style 
‘masters’. The French DIRECTTE inspectors, by contrast, are forced to exercise enforcement 
discretion because of the Labour Code’s mass of inflexible, unqualifiable and sometimes 
contradictory duties. As one recent official report admitted: ‘The Law in practice is, by nature, not 
fully overlapping with the Law... Full compliance with the law is aspirational because of the 
complexity of the Code du Travail, the number of companies to inspect, the reality of the current 
practices of some of these companies, the amount of work required to establish some 
infringements of the law’ (DIRECTTE, 2012, p.32/38). Thus, whereas ‘regulatory conversations’ in 
the UK are around what trade-offs are legally acceptable, equivalent ‘conversations’ in France are 
less consensual and more about which laws to apply and which to ignore. Such implementation 
gaps are common in France; indeed the centrality of negotiation to making the law ‘work’ is said 
by some to be a central characteristic of the French State (Dupuy and Thoenig 1983). It is perhaps 
no surprise, then, that regulatory action tends to be reactive; as Chaumette (1992, 29) has 
observed, ‘infringement often comes to light only after the occurrence of an accident’. 
 Given these gaps in regulatory enforcement, the technical inspectorates from German and 
French social insurers play a significant role in shaping OHS trade-offs in the workplace. In 
Germany, the BG inspectorates undertake approximately twice the number of inspections and 
accident investigations as their Länder counterparts (DGUV 2014; Länder annual statistical reports 
from 2011-2013). While they have powers to prosecute safety violations and to recommend 
premium increases, BG inspectors tend to see themselves as playing an advisory rather than 
policing role. Yet insofar as the frequency of BG investigations tends to correlate with the costs of 
accidents, BG inspectors are driven by insurance logics of compensation risk rather than accident 
prevention per se (HSE 2007 p453). Likewise, insurance premiums are finely calculated to balance 
the containment of pay-outs against the associated costs to members of achieving that aim 
(Matchan 1985). Indeed, historically, compensation concerns sometimes inhibited BGs from 
Rothstein et al. (2015) Varieties of Risk Regulation 
15 
recognising the occupational cause of certain diseases, such as some cancers, several decades 
after other countries such as the UK (HSE 1996, ch.3, 4.3.5). 
 The French Caisses inspectorates have significantly less power than the German BG 
inspectorates and consequently see their role as principally advisory. As one inspector put it to us; 
“We are not there to notice breaches to the labour code. Our only obligation is to suggest 
solutions to dangerous situations”. They can, however, recommend a tripling of premiums and 
have even spent between 1-2% of their income to subsidise safety improvements in workplaces 
(HSE 1996, ch.2, 45). The Caisses also shape workplace behaviours by defining which diseases and 
accidents are work-related (see Bruno et al 2012), and by setting risk-based contribution rates. 
Indeed, like the German BGs they have been criticised for delays in recognising certain 
occupational diseases, such as asbestos-related mesothelioma, which became a major public 
scandal in France in the 1990s (Rivest 2002, p101). To the extent to that risk-based logics infuse 
the work of the Caisses, their decision-making tends to be driven by ‘secondary’ insurance 
concerns- i.e. the ‘cost of risk’- as much as by the primary risks of physical harm and ill-health. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have shown how four leading EU-member states differently accommodate the 
trade-offs between cost and safety that OHS regulation inevitably involves. In contrast to the focus 
of transatlantic comparisons of risk regulation on the degree of precaution in statutory goals 
(e.g.Weiner et al. 2010; Vogel 2012), our findings here suggest that looking no further than narrow 
headline law may too easily mistake ambitious regulatory goals of safety for risk aversion. 
Divergence in how countries have chosen to transpose the EU Framework Directive into law does 
not reflect differences in risk appetite or tolerance for trade-offs between safety and cost. Such 
trade-offs are inevitable and can be seen in each of our countries. Rather differences lie in where 
those trade-offs are made in each regime and how they are institutionally filtered and shaped 
through deeply entrenched legal traditions, regulatory norms and practices and the organization 
of political economy. 
 Thus the UK’s principles-based approach to OHS requires trade-offs to be explicitly sanctioned 
in the headline law because common law rules of legal literalism would struggle in the absence of 
such a principle. That approach creates challenges in ensuring that the SFAIRP principle is 
consistently and correctly applied, but they are mitigated by the activities of an expert 
inspectorate working within a criminal law framework, case-law and best-practice guidance. By 
contrast, the more aspirational nature of headline regulatory goals in the civil law systems of our 
other three countries presents a different set of problems. In those jurisdictions, trade-offs are 
instead reflected in the elaboration of extensive codes of legal rules and guidance that are proxies 
for achieving headline regulatory goals, be they the ambitious goals of safety in Germany and 
France or the more qualified approach of the Netherlands. Their more prescriptive approach 
sacrifices flexibility for legal precision, but in turn demands rules for each and every workplace 
situation. Since there could never be sufficient requisite variety in OHS rules to detail the trade-
offs appropriate in every case, then trade-offs must be accommodated in other ways, such as 
through discretionary enforcement within a predominantly administrative law setting. 
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 Beyond highlighting legal tradition and regulatory culture as key drivers of variety in risk 
regulation, our article goes further to show that while trade-offs are inevitably made between 
safety and cost in each of our four countries, differences in the organization of corporatist rule-
making and compensation have significant consequences for the framing of risk trade-offs. In the 
UK and Netherlands, where accident prevention is decoupled from social insurance, regulation is 
centrally concerned with trading the ex ante costs of preventing accidents and ill-health against 
worker safety. In the dual systems of France and Germany, however, regulatory concerns for 
worker safety are tempered by the logics of their social insurance regimes that trade the ex ante 
costs of preventing accidents and ill-health against ex post compensation costs. While reducing ex 
post compensation costs may sometimes be correlated with improvements in worker safety, 
efforts to manage compensation risk may well sometimes compromise worker safety. 
Our analysis, therefore, not only identifies important differences in the ways that European 
polities govern risks that have hitherto been overlooked by the focus of the comparative risk 
governance literature on headline law, but also challenges assumptions in the Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) literature about the political economy of worker protection. Superficially, the 
organisation of OHS regulation might appear to accord with VoC expectations. Thus the UK’s 
principles based approach to OHS regulation is consistent with the expectation that liberal market 
economies (LMEs) give employers flexibility in organising their labour relations. Similarly, the 
German delegation of regulatory and compensation functions to legally mandated corporatist 
mutual trade-associations backed-up by state enforcement is consistent with VoC expectations 
about coordinated market economies (CMEs), as is the Dutch delegation of the Labour Catalogues 
to sectoral associations. Likewise, the state-driven negotiations between the social partners both 
in regulation and compensation in France fit with VoC expectations of a state market economy. 
 However, our study challenges the implicit expectation of the VoC literature that workers are 
better protected in C/SMEs than in LMEs, because the latter do not place the same value on 
workforce stability. Rather a major cleavage in approaches to protection amongst our four 
countries is related to whether state regulation is driven solely by accident prevention concerns, 
or additionally, if not principally, by insurance logics of compensation cost containment. Indeed, 
one major finding of this analysis is that while Germany and France like to portray the Anglo-Saxon 
practice of explicitly valuing life in regulation as a cultural anathema, those countries simply put a 
price on life through their social insurance regimes. From that perspective, the Netherlands- 
despite its co-ordinated market economy- has more in common with the UK than with Germany or 
France. Thus the social insurance focus on ex post compensation in Germany and France may 
favour getting workers back to work, but the decoupling of compensation from OHS regulation in 
the Netherlands and the UK may better favour preventing accidents and ill-health in the first 
place. 
 At the same time, decoupling in the UK and Netherlands means that ex post costs- which are so 
closely managed in France and Germany- can only be contained through separate action on 
helping workers back into jobs, crackdowns on benefit fraud and, in the UK, much handwringing 
over the NHS picking up the costs of a wide set of social ills. The Dutch have more actively sought 
to contain the escalating costs of disability benefit by making employers liable for the first two 
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years of payments. However, since employers can privately insure against those costs it remains to 
be seen how effective that measure will be in reducing disability bills. 
 In that context, it is perhaps easier to understand the conflict that underpinned the EC’s 
complaint about the UK. If SFAIRP qualifies the liability of employers for workplace injuries and 
illnesses, then it is not hard to see why continental Commission officials and European trade 
unions struggled to accept it, given that continental regimes are founded on no-fault liability to 
ensure ex post costs are always met. That concern is not unknown in the UK; for example, anxiety 
about the implications of SFAIRP for compensation were raised in parliamentary debates on the 
HSWA in the 1970s, as they were in 2012 when some vestiges of the old regime were expunged 
from the statute book. In the UK, however, those concerns are relatively residual because the 
costs of injury and ill-health are socialised through the tax-funded branches of the welfare state. 
 Our study makes four further contributions. First, our attention to compensation highlights an 
important limitation in comparative debates about risk governance, which generally have little to 
say about regimes where regulation is not the State’s principle lever of control. Second, and 
relatedly, our study addresses the relatively under-theorised relationship between the regulatory 
state and the welfare state (Levi-Faur 2014). The VoC approach, which treats worker protections 
such as the labour regulation and social insurance compensation as dependent variables to be 
explained by their fit with independent variables such as the industrial strategy of capital, fails to 
explain the dynamics of OHS regulation. Rather, we argue that the organization of social insurance 
regimes is a key independent variable that acts as a key ‘boundary condition’ for OHS regulation, 
shaping both its contours and goals. 
 Third, our study also shows how the distinctions often drawn between Anglo-Saxon neo-
liberalism and the more dirigiste and co-ordinated market economies of Europe can reflect legal 
traditions of common and civil law that substantially predate capitalism. While others have argued 
that workers are likely to be less well protected in common law than in civil law countries (Botero 
et al 2004; Ahlering and Deakin 2007), our study suggests that there is no reason to suppose that 
is the case. Comparing like for like, there is no evidence that the UK’s common law regime is 
weaker than the Dutch civil law regime. Rather what is at stake is how those protections are made 
to work in law. In the UK, without the explicit qualification of the statutory duty to ensure safety 
through ideas of risk, legal duties of safety would be absolute and consequently very difficult to 
implement. Such concerns are simply not a problem in civil law jurisdictions where headline 
regulatory goals are aspirational. 
 Finally, our analysis also highlights how geographies of legal culture limit the international 
relevance of flexible, principles-based approaches to regulation. Given the importance of judicial 
interpretation in the common law tradition, it is perhaps no surprise that it is in Britain and its 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ former colonies that principles-based regulation, of which SFAIRP is a paradigmatic 
example, has flourished. The OHS case suggests, however, that attempts to transplant principles-
based regulation into civil law systems are likely to fail because their separation of powers 
doctrines favour the mechanical application of precise legal rules rather than the development of 
interpretive principles that could pit the courts against the legislature. Dutch OHS exemplifies this 
problem insofar as apparently flexible headline regulatory goals are constrained by very rule-
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bound practices of enforcement. Indeed, legal culture may help explain why the UK so often finds 
itself at odds with the EU over a wide range of regulatory issues- from nuclear power safety to civil 
aviation- that it thinks would be better served through flexible interpretive principles rather than 
extensive codified rules. If risk-based approaches to organising regulation have been taken up 
more enthusiastically in Anglo-Saxon countries than in other advanced economies, our analysis 
suggests that this is not so much because of principled differences between Anglo-Saxon neo-
liberalism and other varieties of capitalism about the morality of valuing life or the need to be 
more pro-growth or pro-worker or pro-environment. Rather responses to risk-based approaches 
reflect much deeper institutional differences in the organization of political economy, legal 
tradition and ideals of the state, with roots pre-dating the birth of capitalism itself. 
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